Web of Belief

1 · the check

Choose what you believe.

Go through the statements below and mark the ones you want to examine. Answer as many or as few as you like — there's no login, and your answers stay in this browser. When you reach the bottom, see your results.

↳ how answers are counted

A belief here is a claim you take to be true — not a hope, a guess, or something you’d entertain only in theory (the philosophers’ sense, on the SEP). So only “I believe this” becomes a premise. Being unsure, rejecting, or marking something conditional is never read as believing its opposite — a hypothetical like “if God existed…” isn’t an affirmation. A finding appears only where two beliefs you affirmed genuinely pull against each other; the aim is to surface that pressure, not to score your worldview.

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topic 1 of 5

Freedom and responsibility

Determinism, alternatives, and accountability.

0/3 answered
Given exactly the same complete past and laws of nature, only one future human action is possible.

prop. 01

If the whole past and the laws of nature were exactly the same, only one future action could happen.

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Given exactly the same complete past and laws of nature, only one future human action is possible.

what it means

This is causal or nomological determinism as applied to choices: a metaphysical claim about whether the past and laws fix a unique future. It is not a claim about quantum mechanics, relativity, or whether anyone could in practice predict the outcome.

reason to hold it

Determinists treat actions as part of a world fully fixed by past conditions and natural laws.

reason not to

Indeterminists and libertarians hold that at least some action is not fixed in that way.

sources

[1] Free Will[2] Compatibilism
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At least sometimes, a person could choose differently while the entire past and laws of nature remained exactly the same.

prop. 02

opposite pole

what the opposite-pole mark means

A few statements turn an earlier one around to face the other way. Answer each on its own — you needn’t simply flip your previous answer, and sometimes neither side is yours.

Sometimes you really could choose differently, even with the exact same past and laws of nature.

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At least sometimes, a person could choose differently while the entire past and laws of nature remained exactly the same.

what it means

This asserts alternative possibilities under the same past and laws, rather than freedom understood only as acting on one's reasons.

reason to hold it

Libertarian accounts regard genuine alternative possibilities or agent causation as essential to freedom.

reason not to

Compatibilists reject this requirement; skeptics argue indeterminism alone does not produce control.

sources

[1] Free Will[2] Compatibilism
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A person can sometimes be morally responsible even when no alternative action was possible.

prop. 03

A person can be genuinely responsible even if they could not have done otherwise.

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A person can sometimes be morally responsible even when no alternative action was possible.

what it means

This focuses on moral responsibility, which some accounts distinguish from the power to do otherwise.

reason to hold it

Compatibilist and sourcehood accounts focus on reasons-responsiveness, ownership, or absence of coercion.

reason not to

Incompatibilists hold that fixed action undermines the control needed for blame or praise.

sources

[1] Free Will[2] Compatibilism
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topic 2 of 5

God and evidence

Theism, atheism, suffering, hiddenness, foreknowledge, and evidence.

0/6 answered
A personal God exists who is omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, and perfectly loving.

prop. 04

There is one God who knows everything, can do anything, and is perfectly good and loving.

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A personal God exists who is omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, and perfectly loving.

what it means

This is classical personal theism, not merely a first cause, spirit, or impersonal ground of reality. If you regard talk of God as literally meaningless rather than true or false (theological non-cognitivism), neither this statement nor its denial captures your view — mark unsure.

reason to hold it

Arguments from contingency, moral reality, religious experience, and other evidence are taken by theists to support such a being.

reason not to

Atheists and agnostics challenge the inferences and point to suffering, hiddenness, and competing explanations.

sources

[1] Cosmological Argument[2] Moral Arguments for the Existence of God[3] The Problem of Evil[4] Hiddenness of God
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No god or deity exists.

prop. 05

opposite pole

No gods of any kind exist.

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No god or deity exists.

what it means

This is the positive philosophical claim of atheism, stronger than merely lacking belief.

reason to hold it

Arguments may appeal to the absence of adequate evidence, evil, hiddenness, or low prior plausibility for particular gods.

reason not to

Agnosticism withholds the claim, while theism invokes cosmological, moral, experiential, or revealed grounds.

sources

[1] Atheism and Agnosticism[2] Cosmological Argument[3] The Problem of Evil[4] Hiddenness of God
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Some suffering exists that no omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being could have morally sufficient reason to permit.

prop. 06

Some suffering is so pointless that no all-good, all-powerful God could have a good reason to allow it.

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Some suffering exists that no omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being could have morally sufficient reason to permit.

what it means

The key term is gratuitous: not merely terrible suffering, but suffering unjustifiable for a perfectly good all-powerful being.

reason to hold it

Evidential arguments from evil maintain that the scale or distribution of suffering supports this judgment.

reason not to

Defenses and theodicies propose reasons involving freedom, soul-making, natural laws, or limits on human judgment.

sources

[1] The Problem of Evil
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Some people capable of relating to God honestly seek that relationship, do not resist it, and still cannot believe God exists.

prop. 07

Some sincere people want a relationship with God, are not resisting it, and still cannot believe.

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Some people capable of relating to God honestly seek that relationship, do not resist it, and still cannot believe God exists.

what it means

This concerns nonresistant nonbelief, not indifference or deliberate rejection.

reason to hold it

The hiddenness argument treats apparently sincere nonbelief as evidence against a perfectly loving personal God.

reason not to

Responses dispute whether such nonbelief exists or whether perfect love would always supply unmistakable belief.

sources

[1] Hiddenness of God
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Before a human choice occurs, an infallible divine belief already correctly specifies that exact choice.

prop. 08

God already knows exactly what each person will choose, before they choose it, and cannot be wrong.

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Before a human choice occurs, an infallible divine belief already correctly specifies that exact choice.

what it means

The statement deliberately concerns prior, error-proof knowledge of a concrete future act.

reason to hold it

Many conceptions of divine omniscience include complete knowledge of future human actions.

reason not to

Open theism restricts the content of foreknowledge; Boethian and Aquinas-style eternity replies hold that timeless knowledge does not make the future fixed for an agent acting in time; Molinism appeals to counterfactuals of freedom; Ockhamists distinguish hard and soft facts about the past. The 'live argument' below names the bridge premise these replies reject.

sources

[1] Foreknowledge and Free Will[2] Free Will
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It is wrong to accept a claim as true unless it is adequately supported by evidence.

prop. 09

You should not accept a claim as true unless there is good evidence for it.

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It is wrong to accept a claim as true unless it is adequately supported by evidence.

what it means

This is evidentialism about belief, applied to any claim, including religious and anti-religious ones.

reason to hold it

Evidentialists such as Locke and W. K. Clifford argue that believing beyond the evidence is intellectually and morally irresponsible.

reason not to

Reformed epistemologists hold some beliefs can be properly basic, and pragmatists allow non-evidential grounds; the principle may also struggle to support itself.

sources

[1] Epistemology of Religion
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topic 3 of 5

Right action and animals

Consequences, moral limits, and what we owe sentient animals.

0/5 answered
Whether an action is morally right depends only on how good or bad its consequences are.

prop. 10

An act is right or wrong only because of how good or bad its results are.

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Whether an action is morally right depends only on how good or bad its consequences are.

what it means

This is consequentialism: outcomes are the sole determinant of rightness, with no act ruled out in advance.

reason to hold it

Consequentialists argue that what ultimately matters morally is making outcomes better rather than worse.

reason not to

Deontologists object that this can require betraying, harming, or using people whenever the totals come out ahead.

sources

[1] Consequentialism[2] Deontological Ethics
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Some actions are morally wrong even when performing them would produce the best overall consequences.

prop. 11

opposite pole

Some acts are wrong even if they would bring about the best overall outcome.

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Some actions are morally wrong even when performing them would produce the best overall consequences.

what it means

This asserts agent-relative constraints, such as a duty not to kill an innocent person even to prevent more deaths.

reason to hold it

Deontologists hold that persons have rights or dignity that cannot be overridden by aggregate benefit.

reason not to

Consequentialists argue it is irrational to forbid an act that genuinely makes the world go best.

sources

[1] Deontological Ethics[2] Consequentialism
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Sentient non-human animals deserve direct moral consideration because their suffering matters.

prop. 12

Animals' suffering matters for their own sake, not just because humans care.

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Sentient non-human animals deserve direct moral consideration because their suffering matters.

what it means

Direct consideration means animal suffering counts for their own sake, not only because humans care.

reason to hold it

Sentience-based approaches hold that the capacity for suffering establishes serious interests.

reason not to

Some views ground full moral status in rational personhood or assign animals only indirect or lesser duties.

sources

[1] The Moral Status of Animals
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Causing severe avoidable suffering to a sentient animal merely for minor convenience or taste is morally wrong.

prop. 13

It is wrong to cause severe, avoidable animal suffering just for taste or convenience.

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Causing severe avoidable suffering to a sentient animal merely for minor convenience or taste is morally wrong.

what it means

The claim is restricted to severe, avoidable harm traded for a minor interest.

reason to hold it

Interest-based arguments hold that avoiding severe suffering outweighs replaceable dietary preferences.

reason not to

Objections challenge the moral status, the comparison of interests, or what harms are genuinely avoidable.

sources

[1] The Moral Status of Animals
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Even when practical alternatives are available to me, it is morally permissible to buy food from systems that severely harm sentient animals merely for taste or convenience.

prop. 14

Even when I have practical alternatives, it is morally fine for me to buy food from systems that severely harm animals just for taste or convenience.

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Even when practical alternatives are available to me, it is morally permissible to buy food from systems that severely harm sentient animals merely for taste or convenience.

what it means

This is deliberately conditional: it does not address survival, health necessity, subsistence, or uncertainty about production.

reason to hold it

Defenses may deny that consumer purchase is wrongful participation or give human preference greater weight.

reason not to

Animal-ethics arguments maintain that participating for a replaceable interest fails to respect serious animal interests.

sources

[1] The Moral Status of Animals
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topic 4 of 5

Morality and meaning

Objective value, moral grounding, and meaningful lives.

0/6 answered
At least some moral facts are true regardless of what any person or society approves.

prop. 15

Some things are really right or wrong, whatever anyone thinks or approves.

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At least some moral facts are true regardless of what any person or society approves.

what it means

For example, whether cruelty is wrong is not made true merely by our preferences or conventions.

reason to hold it

Moral realists argue that moral disagreement, reasoning, and apparent moral error make sense in terms of objective facts.

reason not to

Anti-realists offer expressivist, error-theoretic, or subjectivist explanations without mind-independent moral facts.

sources

[1] Moral Anti-Realism[2] Moral Arguments for the Existence of God
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Every moral truth depends only on the attitudes or approvals of persons or societies.

prop. 16

opposite pole

Right and wrong are only a matter of what people or societies happen to approve of.

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Every moral truth depends only on the attitudes or approvals of persons or societies.

what it means

Affirm this only if no moral truth is independent of all human or social approval. This covers individual subjectivism and cultural or intersubjective relativism alike. Sophisticated constructivist and quasi-realist views sit nearby but may decline both poles, since they earn ordinary moral talk without grounding it in bare approval.

reason to hold it

Subjectivist and relativist approaches can explain moral practice through attitudes, cultures, or commitments.

reason not to

Realists object that approval cannot make atrocities right and that moral criticism often claims objective force.

sources

[1] Moral Anti-Realism
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Every moral obligation obtains solely because God commands it.

prop. 17

Moral duties exist only because God commands them.

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Every moral obligation obtains solely because God commands it.

what it means

This is a strong divine-command claim about obligation, not merely that God reliably commands what is good.

reason to hold it

Theological voluntarists may understand divine commands as supplying authoritative obligations.

reason not to

Critics ask whether commands make cruelty right or whether goodness is independent of commands.

sources

[1] Theological Voluntarism[2] Moral Arguments for the Existence of God
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At least one moral obligation would obtain even if no deity commanded it.

prop. 18

opposite pole

At least one moral duty would still hold even if no God commanded it.

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At least one moral obligation would obtain even if no deity commanded it.

what it means

This accepts at least one command-independent duty, whether or not a God exists.

reason to hold it

Moral realists and some theists hold that goodness or reasons can be prior to, or independent of, commands.

reason not to

Strong divine-command theories deny obligation that is independent of divine willing or commanding.

sources

[1] Theological Voluntarism[2] Moral Anti-Realism
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A finite human life can be objectively meaningful through worthwhile activity even if no God or immortal soul exists.

prop. 19

A human life can be objectively meaningful through worthwhile activity in this world, even without God or an afterlife.

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A finite human life can be objectively meaningful through worthwhile activity even if no God or immortal soul exists.

what it means

Objective naturalism says meaning can depend on real value in this world rather than transcendence. This is about objective meaning, not whether things can matter to you: a subjectivist can hold that family and projects genuinely matter to them while denying any objective meaning.

reason to hold it

Objective naturalists point to knowledge, creativity, love, and improving lives as genuinely worthwhile.

reason not to

Supernaturalists argue that ultimate meaning requires relationship with God or an immortal soul; nihilists deny objective meaning.

sources

[1] The Meaning of Life
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No finite human life can be objectively meaningful unless God or an immortal soul exists.

prop. 20

opposite pole

Without God or an immortal soul, life cannot have any real, objective meaning.

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No finite human life can be objectively meaningful unless God or an immortal soul exists.

what it means

This says transcendence is necessary for objective meaning, not merely helpful or personally important.

reason to hold it

Supernaturalist accounts ground ultimate significance in God, immortality, or both.

reason not to

Objective naturalist and hybrid accounts identify meaningful activity within finite human life.

sources

[1] The Meaning of Life
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topic 5 of 5

Mind and consciousness

Physical completeness, artificial minds, and subjective experience.

0/3 answered
Once every physical fact is fixed, every fact about conscious experience is fixed too.

prop. 21

If all the physical facts are fixed, the facts about conscious experience are fixed too.

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Once every physical fact is fixed, every fact about conscious experience is fixed too.

what it means

This is a supervenience-style physicalist claim: no mental difference without a physical difference.

reason to hold it

Physicalists argue that a complete physical account is enough for all actual facts, including mental facts.

reason not to

Dualists and consciousness-based objections maintain that subjective experience may not be physically entailed.

sources

[1] Physicalism[2] Dualism
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A world physically identical to ours but entirely lacking conscious experience is genuinely possible.

prop. 22

opposite pole

A world could be physically just like ours and still have no conscious experience at all.

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A world physically identical to ours but entirely lacking conscious experience is genuinely possible.

what it means

This is the philosophical-zombie possibility claim, not a prediction about actual neuroscience.

reason to hold it

Conceivability arguments (Chalmers) use such a world to challenge physicalist entailment of consciousness.

reason not to

Conceivability is not possibility: a priori imaginability can outrun what is metaphysically possible (Type-B physicalists), and illusionists (Frankish, Dennett) deny we even conceive a coherent zombie. Affirm this only if you mean genuine metaphysical possibility, not merely that the scenario seems imaginable.

sources

[1] Physicalism[2] Dualism
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Some future non-biological artificial intelligence systems could have conscious experience.

prop. 23

Some future AI systems, even if not made of living tissue, could really be conscious.

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Some future non-biological artificial intelligence systems could have conscious experience.

what it means

This concerns possible future systems and genuine subjective experience, not whether current chatbots are conscious or merely persuasive.

reason to hold it

Functionalist and computationalist approaches leave room for mentality realized in different physical materials, and recent AI-consciousness work treats future systems as serious candidates under some theories.

reason not to

Biological or non-computational views may hold that consciousness depends on living neural systems, or that behavior and functional organization do not settle whether experience is present.

sources

[1] The 2020 PhilPapers Survey[2] The Computational Theory of Mind[3] Consciousness[4] Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness[5] Could a Large Language Model be Conscious?
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That's all of them. Skipped statements count as “Not sure,” and only the ones you affirm can trigger a finding — so partial answers are fine.