method & sources
Web of Belief reports relationships among exact statements you mark as true. It does not infer a complete worldview or assign a consistency score. The aim is fewer claims, better defended.
how the engine reasons
No LLM call, no database, no account, no server-side scoring.
classification standard
As worded, both claims can't be true at once.
example — Affirming both that at least one moral fact is independent of approval and that every moral truth depends only on approval.
rule — Reported only where the precise affirmed sentences negate one another or cannot both hold under their stated definitions.
Each claim is fine alone; together, with one added premise, they entail a further conclusion.
example — Affirming both that no deity exists and that every moral obligation is true solely because God commands it — which together entail that nothing is obligatory.
rule — Surfaced when affirmed statements, sometimes under an explicitly stated added premise, entail a further conclusion you may not have meant to accept. It is not a contradiction, and the added premise is open to rejection.
No outright clash — the two beliefs sit in real tension, and the step that connects them is one people genuinely argue over.
example — Affirming both a perfectly loving personal God and nonresistant nonbelief.
rule — The result states the additional bridge premise needed to infer an incompatibility and treats its truth as open for examination.
Often called incompatible in debate, yet a recognized position holds them together.
example — Affirming both atheism and objective meaning through finite worthwhile activity.
rule — Surfaced when the pairing is often rhetorically challenged but is represented by a recognized philosophical position.
why no Z3 verdict
A SAT or SMT tool such as Z3 can find inconsistency once propositions and implications have been formalized. The hard part here is whether a natural-language commitment entails a bridge premise: for example, whether perfect love entails unmistakable divine availability, or whether responsibility requires alternate possibilities. Those are disputed philosophical questions, not solver failures. This app therefore keeps a small inspectable rule set and exposes each premise instead of disguising interpretation as proof.
topic selection
The initial domains come from the official PhilPapers 2020 Survey, which asked philosophers 100 questions, including God, meta-ethics, meaning of life, mind, other minds, free will, and eating animals. Public importance of religious-worldview questions is checked against Pew Research Center's 2023–24 Religious Landscape Study. These sources justify salience; they do not determine which answer is correct.
source library
Source review completed 2 June 2026. Position summaries in the checker are paraphrases; follow the original entries and linked research for full arguments and bibliographies.
PhilPeople / PhilPapers
Topic selection: its 100 questions include God, meta-ethics, meaning, mind, other minds, free will, trolley cases, and eating animals.
Pew Research Center
Public relevance: a large United States survey about religious affiliation, belief in God, and social views.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Distinguishes lacking belief, asserting that no gods exist, and suspension of judgment.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Surveys arguments from contingency, explanation, and beginnings to a necessary or divine cause, with objections.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Explains arguments relating moral normativity or dignity to God and their contested premises.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Maps logical and evidential arguments from suffering and theistic defenses or theodicies.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Presents the argument from nonresistant nonbelief and theistic responses.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Examines divine-command accounts of obligation and Euthyphro-style concerns.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Defines mind-independent moral realism and several ways of denying it.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Surveys supernaturalist, objective naturalist, subjective, hybrid, and nihilist views of meaning.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Introduces alternative-possibilities, sourcehood, responsibility, and theological issues.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Defends and challenges accounts on which determinism and responsible agency can coexist.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Surveys theological fatalism and compatibilist responses.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Defines physicalist completeness and addresses consciousness objections.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Covers mental/physical distinction and arguments from consciousness.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Surveys views on which mental processes are computational and could be implemented in different physical systems.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Frames phenomenal consciousness, its explanation, functional role, and zombie-style debates.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Presents Searle's argument, replies, and later discussion of artificial understanding and consciousness.
arXiv
Applies scientific theories of consciousness to AI systems and discusses how future systems might implement relevant indicators.
David J. Chalmers / arXiv
Argues that current LLMs face serious obstacles while successors may become serious candidates for consciousness.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Reviews sentience, personhood, interests, and food-choice implications.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Defines the view that rightness depends only on outcomes, and its main objections.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Presents agent-relative constraints on which some acts are wrong even when they maximize the good.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Presents character-based accounts of right action in contrast to duty-based and outcome-based approaches, with the main objections.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Covers conceptions of God as persuasive rather than all-controlling, with genuinely limited power, and how they answer the problem of evil.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Presents the not-self doctrine: persons as streams of connected physical and mental events without an enduring substantial self.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Covers evidentialism (Locke, Clifford) and reformed-epistemology replies about belief in God.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Surveys experience-based arguments for spiritual or religious reality and naturalistic explanations of those experiences.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Explains constructivist views on which moral truths are fixed by rational or practical procedures rather than by bare approval or stance-independent facts.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Frames radical skeptical hypotheses, closure principles, and ordinary-knowledge replies.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Surveys psychological-continuity, bodily-continuity, animalist, and soul-based accounts of persistence over time.
privacy & wellbeing
Your answers stay in browser memory for the current page and are not sent to any server. The share action only emits counts and the structural shape of your affirmations — never your individual stances. The image is rendered in your browser, not uploaded.
The only outbound signal is anonymous, cookieless usage data via Vercel Web Analytics: pageviews (URL path, country, device class) and a few progress events — whether the check was started, roughly which step was reached, and whether results were viewed or shared. There is no IP storage, no fingerprinting, and crucially no record of which statements you affirmed. Full detail is on the privacy page.
A result just sends you back to the reasons behind a belief. It says nothing about your intelligence, your character, or who you are.